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A CRITIQUE OF BuRRow v. ARCE
CHARLES SILVER*
I. INTRODUCTION: POLITICS AND ETHICS
On March 28, 1996, Texas Attorney General Dan Morales
announced the filing of a Medicaid recovery suit against the tobacco
industry.' He also released the Outside Counsel Agreement ("OCA")
between the State and the private attorneys who would represent it. The
OCA provided that the attorneys would receive a 15% contingent fee.
2
As the lawsuit raced toward an early trial setting, not a single
public official questioned the reasonableness of the fee or any other part of
the OCA. No one argued that Morales lacked authority to hire outside
counsel. No one claimed that the State possessed sovereign immunity
from fee obligations. No one contended that the legislature had to
appropriate funds.
3
Co-Director, Center on Lawyers, Civil Justice, and the Media, and Cecil D. Redford
Professor, University of Texas School of Law. I am grateful for comments from Steven
Goode and for the permission of my colleague, Lynn Baker, to use ideas that we jointly
developed.
The views expressed in this Article belong solely to the author. They cannot be
attributed to the University of Texas, its Law School, or the Center for Lawyers, Civil
Justice, and the Media, none of which has endorsed them.
The author advised the private attorneys who won Texas' tobacco lawsuit on
professional responsibility and other subjects. The author also submitted a series of
amicus curiae briefs in Burrow v. Arce arguing against the availability of fee recoupment
in the absence of harm. All of the information discussed in this article is a matter of
fublic record.
Kathy Walt, Texas Set to Sue Cigarette Makers; Morales to Announce Bid to Recover
Medicaid Costs, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 28, 1996, at 33.
2 Robert Elder, Jr. et al., Morales' Team: Dream or Nightmare?, TEX. LAW., Apr. 1,
1996, at 1.
3For example, George W. Bush, then Governor of Texas, wished Morales "all the best"
when commenting on the announcement of the lawsuit. Wayne Slater, A.G. Says
Tobacco Industry Could be in for a Fight, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 22, 1996, at
8A. TEX. Gov'T CODE § 323.006 (2002) empowered the Texas legislature to appoint a
representative for the purpose of intervening in the lawsuit. The legislature did not
exercise this option, even though it was in session during the lawsuit.
323
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
Then, in January 1998, when settlement negotiations ended the
case on favorable terms for the state, "all hell broke loose." 4 Governor
George W. Bush, seven legislators, and John Comyn, a Republican
candidate to succeed Morales as Attorney General, intervened to attack the
payment of fees.5 They lodged every conceivable charge of misconduct
and error, specifically including those just mentioned.6 They also accused
David G. Folsom, the presiding federal district court judge, of applying the
wrong legal standard when reviewing the settlement and finding the fee
reasonable.
In my opinion, the fee fracas had everything to do with politics and
nothing to do with legal ethics. Morales was a Democrat, the private
attorneys supported the Democratic Party, and the presiding federal judge
was a Clinton appointee. 7 Bush, Comyn, and most of the legislators were
Republicans. Bush was seeking the Presidency, and Comyn was running
for Attorney General. The legislators' intervention was sparked by,
coordinated with, and apparently financed in part by persons associated
with Texans for Reasonable Legal Fees ("TRLF"), a tort reform group
with ties to tobacco interests and the Republican Party.
Today, the concrete effects of this partisan activity require a more
serious assessment. What began as a partisan fistfight matured into a
federal investigation of misconduct in public office and a legal precedent
regarding fee forfeiture for breach of fiduciary duty.8  Before the fee
dispute finally ends-and no end is in sight, even though it already has
lasted far longer than the tobacco case did-it may also generate the
4JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, bk. IV., 1, 918 (Christopher Ricks ed., English Poets
2000) (1667) ("Wherefore with thee / Came not all Hell broke loose?").
5 Bush Files Suit Over Tobacco Case Fees, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 6, 1998, at
P3A.
6 David E. Dahiquist, Inherent Conflict: A Case Against the Use of Contingency Fees by
Special Assistants in Quasi-Governmental Prosecutorial Roles, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 743,
777 (2000).
7 Gregory Curtis, Smoke Detectors, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 1998, at 9.
8 The federal investigation occurred because of questionable dealings between Morales
and a Houston attorney named Marc Murr. Murr neither signed the OCA nor had a
relationship with the trial team. Yet, with Morales' support, Murr claimed to have
provided valuable services and to have a separate contract with the state entitling him to
hundreds of millions of dollars. This contract was neither released to the press before the
case settled nor turned over to the defendants during discovery. It also was of
questionable validity because it did not specify the payment Murr was due and appeared
to have been doctored. Worse, members of the trial team refused to vouch for Murr's
contribution because, to their knowledge, Murr did nothing of importance. Murr became
known as the "stealth lawyer" because his work, said to have consisted of behind-the-
scenes conversations with Morales, was undetectable.
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largest fee forfeiture action in history. As this Article goes to press, now-
Attorney General Comyn is continuing to investigate allegations that the
private attorneys breached their fiduciary duties to the state.
The precedent relating to fee forfeiture came about as a result of
litigation in Burrow v. Arce, a legal malpractice case that was working its
way through the Texas state courts when the fee dispute erupted in the
federal tobacco case.9 Burrow grew out of a mass tort lawsuit in which
126 plaintiffs collectively recovered approximately $190 million.1 °
Despite the enormity of the recovery, forty-nine of the claimants sued their
former lawyers, accusing them of misconduct and disloyalty.
11
Eventually, the case reached the Texas Supreme Court on a legal issue:
Can a former client recover from a disloyal attorney without proving
harm? 2
The justices ruled unanimously that fee recoupment is available in
the absence of harm.' 3 One might have predicted a vote this lop-sided in a
case squarely governed by precedent. Before Burrow, though, no Texas
case recognized the right to recoup fees for breach of fiduciary duty in the
absence of harm. The decision was an innovation.
The published opinion hides this. Writing for the court, Justice
Nathan Hecht claims to follow the Restatement (Second) of Agency and
prior Texas cases. The assertion is false. Anyone who compares the
Justice Hecht's statements about these authorities to the originals will see
numerous and obvious inaccuracies.
The only authority that supported the justices was the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.14 Apparently, they found it too
frail a reed to support their decision. This was a sensible conclusion. The
authority supporting the Restatement (Third) was weak, none of it was
Texas law, and the Restatement (Third) provided no analytical defense for
the rule it endorsed.
This Article will critique the Burrow opinion. Part Two will focus
on the Restatement (Second) of Agency and will show that the Texas
Supreme Court ignored the carefully developed structure of general
agency law while purporting to respect it. Part Three will show that the
9 Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999).
10 ld. at 232.
I Id.
12 Id. at 237.
13 Id. at 247.
14 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996).
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court grossly distorted Texas cases while purporting to respect them. Part
Four will discuss the harm requirement itself. It will show that harm plays
a crucial role in distinguishing permissible actions in conflict situations
from impermissible ones, and that, by removing this requirement, the
Texas Supreme Court put mass tort lawyers in an untenable position. Part
Five will consider the merits of the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers. Part Six will draw a brief conclusion.
II. AGENCY LAW
Agency law treats two situations very differently. In the first, a
principal discovers a disloyal act, fires the agent responsible for it, is sued
by the agent for unpaid fees, and asserts disloyalty as a defense to the
agent's claim. I will call this scenario "A v. P" because the agent is the
plaintiff in the lawsuit seeking fees.
When A v. P arises, agency law entitles P to assert disloyalty as a
defense to A's claim for payment. 5 The agent may lose the right to a fee
even if the principal cannot prove harm.16
In the second situation, a principal voluntarily pays an agent,
subsequently discovers a disloyal act, and then sues the agent for a
remedy. I will call this scenario "P v. A," the principal being the plaintiff
in the suit for compensation.
Agency law does not recognize fee forfeiture (more accurately, fee
recoupment) as a remedy in P v. A. It entitles P to a remedy if P incurred
a loss. Otherwise, it sends P home empty-handed. To put the matter
simply, agency law does not establish fee recoupment as a principal's
remedy.
The Texas Supreme Court ignored the distinction between A v. P
and P v. A. According to the court, Burrow asked "whether an attorney
who breaches his fiduciary duty to his client may be required to forfeit all
or part of his fee, irrespective of whether the breach caused the client
actual damages."'17 This statement is crucially ambiguous. The answer is
"yes" in A v. P situations where disloyalty is a defense to an agent's claim
for unpaid fees. But the answer is "no" in P v. A situations where a
disgruntled principal seeks a remedy. Burrow was a P v. A situation.
To see that no right of fee recoupment in the absence of harm
exists under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, one need only consult
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 cmt. b (1958).
16 Id. § 469 cmt. a.
17Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 232.
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section 399. Entitled "Remedies of Principal," section 399 exhaustively
lists the remedies principals are legally entitled to seek from agents who
commit wrongful acts. s  No right of fee recoupment appears in this
section. The closest analogue is subparagraph (k), which identifies
"refusal to pay compensation" as a remedy. 19 There being an obvious
difference between refusing to pay compensation and recovering
compensation already paid, a plain language assessment of section 399
should have put the plaintiffs' claim for fee recoupment in Burrow to rest.
A textual analysis strengthens this conclusion. The comment to
subparagraph (k) of section 399 states that "[t]he circumstances under
which a principal is entitled to refuse to pay compensation to an agent who
has been guilty of a violation of duty are stated in Section 456. ' '20 Section
456 reads as follows:
§ 456. REVOCATION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
OR RENUNCIATION IN BREACH OF CONTRACT
If a principal properly discharges an agent for breach of
contract, or the agent wrongfully renounces the
employment, the principal is subject to liability to pay to
the agent, with a deduction for the loss caused the principal
by the breach of contract:
(a) the agreed compensation for services properly rendered
for which the compensation is apportioned in the contract,
whether or not the agent's breach is wilful and deliberate;
and
(b) the value, not exceeding the agreed ratable
compensation, of services properly rendered for which the
compensation is not apportioned if, but only if, the agent's
breach is not wilful and deliberate.
21
Section 456 had no application to Burrow. The plaintiffs did not
discharge the lawyers, and the attorneys did not withdraw. The
representations continued until the plaintiffs' claims were resolved. The
allegations of misconduct all related to completed representations in which
the lawyers were voluntarily paid.
Is RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 399 (1958).
19 Id. § 399 cmt. k.
20 Id.
21 Id. § 456 (emphasis added).
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When discussing the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Texas
Supreme Court considered neither section 399 nor section 456. This is a
clear signal that something is amiss. Section 399 sets out a principal's
remedies, and Burrow was a P v. A situation. Section 399 was therefore
the right place to start. As stated, only subparagraph (k) of section 399
concerned fees. It mentioned refusal to pay, not fee recoupment, and it
directed readers to section 456, which limits the right of refusal to
situations in which the principal fires the agent or the agent withdraws.
The Burrow court latched onto section 469 of the Restatement
(Second). It reads as follows:
An agent is entitled to no compensation for conduct
which is disobedient or which is a breach of his duty of
loyalty; if such conduct constitutes a wilful and
deliberate breach of his contract of service, he is not
entitled to compensation even for properly performed
services for which no compensation is apportioned.22
Although the language of this section seems to support the conclusion
reached in Burrow, it does not create a remedy that a principal may assert
in a P v. A situation. The point of saying that an agent has no right to
compensation for disloyal conduct is to establish disloyalty as a defense to
an agent's claim for unpaid compensation in an A v. P situation.
Section 469 appears in chapter 14 of the Restatement, entitled
"Duties and Liabilities of Principal to Agent." A chapter dedicated to a
principal's responsibilities to an agent would be an odd place to locate a
principal's right to recover damages from an agent. The point of chapter
14 is to identify rights agents may assert against principals in A v. P
situations.
Section 469 also appears in title C of chapter 14. Title C bears the
heading "Defenses." Along with disloyalty, the sections under title C
address illegality, statutes of frauds, discharge, bankruptcy, statutes of
limitations, and laches. Section 469A even bears the title "Other events
terminating or diminishing agent's claim." Plainly, all sections in title C
set out defenses that principals may assert against agents in A v. P
situations.23
Section 469 itself bears the following title: "Disloyalty or
Insubordination as Defense. This makes it abundantly clear, as if further
22 Id. § 469.
23 Id. §§ 467-69A.
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clarification were needed, that the section identifies a defense, not a
remedy. By using section 469 as a remedial provision, the Supreme Court
of Texas fundamentally altered agency law.
I explained the straightforward structure of the Restatement
(Second) in a series of amicus briefs.24 The justices dismissed my
analysis:
Amici argue that this rule [i.e., the one stated in § 469(b)] is
limited by the caption of section 469, "Disloyalty or
Insubordination as Defense. But the comments to section
469 do not limit application of the rule to the defense of an
agent's claim for compensation. Comment a states in part:
"An agent is entitled to no compensation for a service
which constitutes a violation of his duties of obedience."
Comment e adds that a "principal can maintain an action to
recover the amount" of compensation paid to an agent to
which the agent is not entitled. Amici argue that the scope
of the rule should not be found in the comments, but we
think there is more justification for looking to the
comments than to two words in the title.25
Obviously, this response ignores the larger structure of the
Restatement (Second). It ignores the fact that section 399, which lists
principals' remedies comprehensively, does not mention fee recoupment
in the absence of harm. It ignores the fact that the sections immediately
following section 399, which discuss particular remedies in detail, do not
mention this remedy either. It ignores the discharge requirement that, per
section 456, is a condition for refusing to pay compensation. It ignores the
fact that section 469 appears in chapter 14, which concerns principals'
responsibilities to agents, not their rights against agents. It ignores the fact
that title C explicitly focuses on principals' defenses to agents' claims for
unpaid fees. Finally, it assigns no weight to the title of section 469, as
though the authors of the Restatement 2Second) did not know the
difference between a remedy and a defense.
24 1 also noted and rejected the possibility of reaching section 469 through section 401 of
the Restatement. Because Arce does not mention section 401, I will say nothing more
about this possibility here.
25 Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 244 (Tex. 1999).
26The lead Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Agency was Warren A. Seavey of
Harvard Law School. Seavey wrote about remedies and defenses many times. See, e.g.,
WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 28-31 (1964)..
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The only reason offered for ignoring the title of section 469 is that
"the comments [to the section] do not limit application of the rule to the
defense of an agent's claim for compensation."' Apparently, to convince
the Texas Supreme Court that they were discussing defenses in section
469, the Reporters had to say so in every sentence. It was not enough to
carefully separate remedies available in P v. A situations from defenses
available in A v. P situations, locating the two in different titles and
chapters and giving them appropriately descriptive names. Nor was it
enough to supplement this structural separation with descriptive section
headings that again distinguished remedies from defenses. Because the
Reporters did not use the word "defense" in two comments that, in the
hierarchy of the Restatement (Second), were subordinate to everything just
mentioned, the justices concluded that the comments turned a shield into a
sword. Why the Reporters hid a sword in an obscure location instead of
placing it in section 399, a principal's armory, the court did not say.
In the Restatement (Second), the path to section 469 is clearly
marked with signposts explaining that in this direction lie defenses for use
in A v. P situations. The justices knew this, yet when they got to section
469, they unanimously claimed to have found a remedy for use in P v. A
situations. The Emperor says he is fully clothed; therefore, he is.
As easily as they dealt with the signposts, the justices dispatched
Mechem on Agency,28 a leading turn-of-the-century treatise, even more
simply. They ignored it. This is noteworthy because the court followed
Mechem in Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp.,29 the case that,
by the justices' own admission, was closest to Burrow.3° Mechem agreed
with the Restatement (Second). In a section headed "Principal's Right of
Recoupment," the following passages appear:
[D]amages for the losses which the principal may have
sustained by reason of the agent's inefficiency, negligence,
misconduct, or failure to perform the express or implied
covenants, agreements or conditions of his undertaking,
and which would furnish the basis of an action by the
principal against the agent, may be recouped by the
27 Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 244.
28 FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914).
29 160 S.W.2d 509, 514 (Tex. 1942).
30 See Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 238 (stating that, in Kinzbach Tool, the court held that an
agent had to forfeit the secret commission from conflicting interests even though the
principal was not harmed).
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principal in the action brought by the agent [to recover
unpaid compensation] ....
The measure of [a principal's] damages is ... substantially
the same as though an independent action were brought [by
the principal] to recover them. The limit of the recoupment
must, therefore, be the actual damages which directly and
proximately result from the negligence, default or
misconduct of the agent.3'
The message is clear. When A sues P for unpaid fees, P may
counterclaim for losses resulting from A's misconduct.3 When P sues A
for damages, losses also determine whether P recovers. Whether a
principal initiates litigation or seeks relief by way of a counterclaim, harm
is a prerequisite for recovering.
In Burrow, the justices neither cited Mechem nor argued that the
treatise got the law wrong. Mechem was an unwanted reminder of the
signposts in the Restatement (Second), so by consensus the Burrow court
decided that Mechem did not exist.
III. TEXAS CASES
Texans for Reasonable Legal Fees, the interest group that
coordinated the attack on fees in Texas' tobacco case, participated in
Burrow as amicus curiae. TRLF argued that Texas cases recognized the
remedy of fee recoupment in the absence of harm. In reply, I argued that
"stunningly.little authority" supported TRLF's position. To make good on
this charge, I submitted a detailed examination of every Texas case on
which TRLF relied. I paid particular attention to Kinzbach Tool Co. v.
Corbett-Wallace Corp.,3 the only Texas Supreme Court case cited in
TRLF's brief. My conclusion was that Kinzbach Tool did not entitle an
unharmed principal to recoup a fee from a disloyal agent.
In Kinzbach Tool, the agent was a fellow named Turner who, while
Kinzbach Tool's employee (and therefore its fiduciary), negotiated for
31MECHEM, supra note 28, §§ 1595, 1597.
32 In another section, Mechem also recognizes that disloyalty is a defense to an agent's
suit for unpaid fees. Id. § 1588 (entitled "Disloyal agent cannot recover compensation").
160 S.W.2d at 509.
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Kinzbach Tool the purchase of an item called a whipstock from Corbett.
Unbeknownst to Kinzbach Tool, Turner was a double-agent who
represented Corbett pursuant to a secret agreement. Corbett promised to
pay Turner a commission if the sale went through. Turner neither told
Kinzbach Tool that he represented Corbett, a principal with a conflicting
interest in the transaction, nor revealed the size of the hidden commission,
nor informed Kinzbach Tool that Corbett was willing to sell the whipstock
for $20,000. Throughout the transaction, Kinzbach Tool thought that
Turner was its agent alone.
34
Ultimately, Kinzbach Tool bought the whipstock for $25,000.
This was $5000 more than Corbett's reservation price, as Turner knew.
Coincidentally, $5000 also was the size of the secret commission that
Corbett promised to pay Turner from the sale proceeds.
35
Kinzbach Tool subsequently discovered Turner's double-dealing
and fired him on the spot. By this time, Corbett had paid Turner $500 in
commissions, leaving $4500 unpaid. Kinzbach Tool then notified Corbett
of its belief that it was entitled to a $5000 credit against the sales price, the
discount reflecting Turner's undisclosed commission. Corbett refused to
apply the credit, and litigation among Kinzbach Tool, Corbett, and Turner
ensued.36
The Texas Supreme Court determined that Turner was Kinzbach
Tool's fiduciary, that Turner was therefore obligated to meet "high
equitable standards," and that Turner breached the duty of loyalty, which
required him to tell Kinzbach Tool about the conflict, the hidden
commission, and Corbett's reservation price. 37 The court then stated that
"if the fiduciary takes any gift, gratuity, or benefit in violation of his duty,
or acquires an interest adverse to his principal, without full disclosure, it is
a betrayal of his trust and a breach of confidence, and he must account to
his principal for all he has received. 3 8 Finally, the court found that
Corbett was a joint tortfeasor with Turner, and awarded Kinzbach Tool
relief.
39
34 Id. at 510.
35 Id. at 511.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 513-14.
38 Id. at 514 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39 The finding that Corbett was a joint tortfeasor was essential. See MECHEM, supra note
28, § 2137.
[T]he third person who has been guilty of no wrong is ordinarily not
liable to the principal for losses caused to the latter by the misconduct
or default of his own agent. But where the third person conspires with
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From the facts alone it is abundantly clear that the Kinzbach Tool
Court could not possibly have held that a principal, harmed or unharmed,
was entitled to recoup fees from a disloyal agent. Kinzbach Tool
Company did not even attempt to recoup any monies that it paid to Turner
as fees. It demanded credit for the secret commission that Corbett agreed
to pay Turner, most of which Turner never received and none of which
came from Kinzbach Tool. Knowing only the facts, one can exclude the
possibility that Kinzbach Tool recognized a remedy of fee recoupment.
Kinzbach Tool actually stands for the unremarkable proposition
that an agent who receives a hidden benefit when effecting a transaction
must convey the benefit to the principal. This has always been true.
Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency states that, "[u]nless
otherwise agreed, an agent who makes a profit in connection with
transactions conducted by him on behalf of the principal is under a duty to
give such profit to the principal., 40 This requirement, which tracks the tort
of usurpation of corporate opportunity, is no exception to the rule that a
principal's right to damages is limited to its loss. Turner's secret
commission was Kinzbach Tool's loss-it was the appropriation by
Turner of a discount that Kinzbach Tool could have received without
reducing Corbett's profit on the sale. The court's decision to extinguish
Turner's commission and to award Kinzbach Tool the credit merely
restored Kinzbach Tool to its rightful position, i.e., the position it would
have been in if Turner had been loyal.
In Burrow, there was no allegation that the attorney-defendants
received secret commissions in return for settling the plaintiffs' personal
injury claims. The Burrow plaintiffs sought to recover fees they paid the
attorney-defendants themselves. Kinzbach Tool had nothing to say about
this fee recoupment claim. Kinzbach Tool Company neither sought to
recover a dime that it paid Turner in fees nor was awarded a fee recovery.
Consequently, Kinzbach Tool could not have determined the outcome in
Burrow.
Now consider what the Burrow court said about Kinzbach Tool. It
began by observing that "[iun the one case in which we have considered
the agent to perpetrate a fraud upon the principal, he is undoubtedly
liable. So where the third person, by surreptitious dealing with the
agent... has obtained the property of the principal ... the defrauded
principal... is entitled to recover his property... or... to have such
other adequate relief as a court of equity may be able to render under
the circumstances.
Id.
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958).
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the subject, Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., this court held
that an agent was required to forfeit a secret commission received from a
conflicting interest even though the principal was unharmed.",41 The
opening clause is crucially vague. What was "the subject" that Kinzbach
Tool addressed? It certainly was not fee recoupment, the subject of
Burrow. The closing phrase is simply wrong. Kinzbach Tool did not hold
that "the principal was unharmed." When reviewing the facts, the court
stated clearly that Turner's disloyalty cost his employer $5,000: "Turner,
Kinzbach's trusted employee, permitted his employer to consummate a
contract whereby it bought for $25,000 that which he, Turner, knew might
be bought for $20,000."A2
After committing the preceding errors, the Burrow Court set out
the facts of Kinzbach Tool and quoted the following excerpt:
It is beside the point for either Turner or Corbett to say
that Kinzbach suffered no damages because it received
full value for what it has paid and agreed to pay. A
fiduciary cannot say to the one to whom he bears such
relationship: You have sustained no loss by my
misconduct in receiving a commission from a party
opposite to you, and therefore you are without remedy.
It would be a dangerous precedent for us to say that
unless some affirmative loss can be shown, the person
who has violated his fiduciary relationship with another
may hold on to any secret gain or benefit he may have
thereby acquired. It is the law that in such instances if
the fiduciary "takes any gift, gratuity, or benefit in
violation of his duty, or acquires any interest adverse to
his principal, without a full disclosure, it is a betrayal of
his trust and a breach of confidence, and he must
account to his principal for all he has received. 43
This is an accurate statement of agency law; indeed, I quoted it in
one of my amicus briefs. An agent who receives a "secret gain or benefit"
when carrying out an assignment, including a "gift, gratuity, or benefit"
from an undisclosed principal with conflicting interests, must disgorge it
to the principal whether or not the principal is harmed. Obviously, this
41 Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. 1999).
42 Kinzbach Tool, 160 S.W.2d at 513.
43Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 239 (quoting Kinzbach Tool, 160 S.W.2d at 514).
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has nothing to do with Burrow. As stated already, no one claimed that the
attorney-defendants received secret payments.
The Texas Supreme Court never explained the relevance of the
quoted passage to the facts of Burrow. Instead, after quoting the language,
it continued as follows: "Texas courts of appeals; as well as courts in other
jurisdictions and respected commentators, have also held that forfeiture is
appropriate without regard to whether the breach of fiduciary duty resulted
in damages." 44 This statement is overly general, and intentionally so. To
see this, one need merely ask what is to be forfeited: A secret payment
from a third party or a fee voluntarily paid by a client? The common law
of agency distinguishes between the two, as the Restatement (Second) of
Agency makes plain. It requires an agent to disgorge the former and
allows an agent to keep the latter. The court repeatedly ignored this
distinction without admitting that it was trampling the common law.
The court also bludgeoned the cases decided by the "Texas courts
of appeals" that it cited above in support of its "reading" of Kinzbach
Tool. I discussed three of these cases-Bryant v. Lewis,45 Anderson v.
Griffith,46 and Russell v. Truitt47-in my amicus briefs. None supports the
remedy of fee recoupment in the absence of harm.
In Bryant, the plaintiff retained two attorneys, Lewis and
Browning, to handle her claim against a deceased relative's estate.
4 8
Lewis subsequently agreed to represent another person, Blackwell, who
had a competing claim against the same estate. 49 Bryant then discharged
Lewis and Browning and hired new counsel to present her claims and to
attack Blackwell's After being discharged without ?ay, Lewis and
Browning sued Bryant in quantum meruit to collect a fee. In defense of
the suit, Bryant claimed that Lewis' disloyalty extinguished her obligation
to pay. The court of appeals agreed that Lewis was not entitled to
compensation.
2
Bryant does not establish, and could not possibly establish, that a
principal, harmed or unharmed, has any right to recoup fees previously
44 Id. at 33940 (citations omitted).
45 27 S.W.2d 604, 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
46 501 S.W.2d 695, 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
47 554 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
48 Bryant, 27 S.W.2d at 605.
49 Id. at 606.
50 Id.
51Id.
52 Id. at 608.
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paid to an agent. Bryant discharged Lewis without paying him and did not
seek any money from him. The case supports the proposition that a
principal who fires an agent can assert disloyalty as a defense in a suit by
an agent for unpaid fees. Bryant is thus completely consistent with section
469 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.
The Burrow court did not deny this. But it did characterize Bryant
misleadingly. According to the court, Bryant held "that [an] attorney who
represented clients with conflicting interests was not entitled to any
compensation for legal services rendered without addressing whether
actual damages were sustained. 53 This description elides the distinction
between the remedy of fee recoupment and the defense of disloyalty to a
discharged agent's claim for payment. It fails to mention that Bryant was
an A v. P case, not a P v. A case like Burrow.
In Anderson v. Griffith, Anderson had acted as a real estate agent
for the Griffiths, who sold about 50 acres of land for $250,000.54 The
buyer was Anderson himself, acting as trustee. The Griffiths knew this.
What they did not know was that before the sale took place, Anderson had
arranged to resell the property to a group of buyers that included himself 5 6
That group later sold the land to yet another purchaser for twice the
Griffiths' original sale price.5 7
Before the final sale took place, the Griffiths sued Anderson for
breach of fiduciary duty.58 At the time the suit was filed, Anderson still
owned a one-third interest in the land. The Griffiths sought to impose a
constructive trust on this interest. After the sale, the Griffiths disclaimed
any interest in the land and agreed to look to Anderson's share of the sale
proceeds for satisfaction of their claims. 59
The court of appeals found that Anderson breached his duty of
loyalty to the Griffiths by failing to tell them that he expected to make a
profit from the sale of their land in addition to the commission he received
from them as their agent.60 The court then found that Anderson's breach
53Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 239 n.35 (Tex. 1999).
54501 S.W.2d 695, 697-98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
55 Id. at 698.
56 Id. at 698-99.
57 Id.
5 8 ld. at 699.
Id.
60 "[A]n agent may not deal with the subject matter of the agency in such a manner as to
injure the principal, or act in connection with the subject matter so as to secure for
himself secret or unauthorized benefits." Anderson, 501 S.W.2d at 700.
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harmed the Griffiths substantially by depriving them of fair market value
for their land.61
Anderson is not a case in which an unharmed principal recouped
fees from a disloyal agent. It is a case in which the principals lost an
opportunity to enjoy a significant economic gain. Because of Anderson's
secrecy, the Griffiths sold their land for far less, perhaps as much as
$250,000 less, than Anderson knew it to be worth. Anderson is also a case
in which the agent received a hidden profit.
The Burrow court distorted Anderson, offering it for the
proposition that "even though the principal was not injured, '[t]he self-
interest of the agent is considered a vice which renders the transaction
voidable at the election of the principal without looking into the matter
further than to ascertain that the interest of the agent exists."'
62
Obviously, the lead-in is a gross mischaracterization. The court of appeals
emphasized that Anderson's disloyalty harmed the Griffiths by depriving
them of the fair market value of their land.
Finally, consider Russell v. Truitt. There, the principals, a group of
joint venturers on a construction project, recouped $8,000 in fees from a
disloyal agent, and the language of the opinion suggests that the court did
not care whether the principals were injured or not.63 In fact, though, the
Russell principals were harmed severely. As a result of their agent's
misconduct, "the [construction] project's long-term financing was
withdrawn, and the First National Bank of Fort Worth foreclosed on the
project. ' 64  The financial toll appears to have been about $370,000,
although it is impossible to be sure.65 The amount the court awarded the
principals-$8,000 in fees and $55,000 in exemplary damages-was far
less than this.
Again, the Burrow court's characterization is misleading. It
describes Russell as "holding that plaintiffs were entitled to recovery of
agency fees as a matter of law if the breach of fiduciary duty was proved
without regard as to whether the breach caused any harm."66 Given the
significant financial loss in Russell, any statement regarding fee recovery
in the absence of harm can only have been dictum, not holding.
61 Id.
62 Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 239 n.35 (Tex. 1999) (quoting Anderson, 501
S.W.2d at 701).
63 Russell v. Truitt, 554 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
64Id. at 951.
65 Id.
66 Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 239 n.35.
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The Burrow court also referred to two other cases: Watson v.
Limited Partners of WCKT, Ltd.67 and Judwin Properties, Inc. v. Griggs &
Harrison, P. C.68 Neither case offers much support for Burrow.
The court's parenthetical description of Judwin Properties shows
this. According to the court, Judwin Properties states "in dicta that
'[w]hen an attorney has stolen or used the interest to the detriment of his
client, the plaintiff need not prove causation for breach of fiduciary
duty. ,, 69 Given the combination of dictum and harm to the client, Judwin
Properties hardly stands as precedent for the remedy of fee recoupment in
the absence of harm.
If the court is to be believed, Watson should carry much more
weight. It describes Watson as "holding that limited partners may recover
against [a] general partner without a showing of actual damages. 70
Because partners are fiduciaries for each other, this description makes the
case seem relevant.
Once again, however, the court's description is willfully and
wildly inaccurate. In Watson, "a jury found ... that the general partner's
conduct was a proximate cause of damages to the limited partners.",71 On
appeal, the court "overrule[d]" the general partner's contention that "there
[was] no evidence, or insufficient evidence, of any damages proximately
caused by the general partner's conduct in managing affairs of the
partnership." 72  Watson's "holding" cannot possibly be that limited
partners can recover damages without showing harm, whatever the justices
may think.73
I began this section by renewing my claim that "stunningly little
authority" supported TRLF's assertion that Texas cases recognized the
remedy of fee recoupment in the absence of harm. I have now canvassed
every Texas case that the supreme court relied upon in Burrow and shown
this to be true. The justices got the result they wanted by distorting Texas
law.
67 570 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
68 911 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App. 1995).
69 Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 239 n.35 (quoting Judwin Properties, Inc., 911 S.W.2d at 507).
70 Id.
71 Watson, 570 S.W.2d at 180.
72 Id.
73When one reads a page or so further into Watson, one sees that the limited partners lost
$15,900 apiece. Id. at 182. This was money they invested in the project and placed
under the general partner's control. Its recovery was held by the appellate court to be
justified on restitutionary grounds. Its recovery also would be appropriate under section
399 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.
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IV. TRUSTEES VERSUS AGENTS
To this point, I have examined portions of the Burrow opinion that
dealt with the Restatement (Second) of Agency and Texas common law.
In this section, I will turn to passages that analogized from the law of
trusts. My conclusion will be that when reasoning from this body of law,
the justices were vague and superficial.
According to Burrow:
The rule [of fee recoupment for disloyalty] is not dependent
on the nature of the attorney-client relationship . . . but
applies generally in agency relationships. Thus, as we have
already seen, section 243 of the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts sets out a similar rule for forfeiture of a trustee's
compensation: "If the trustee commits a breach of trust, the
court may in its discretion deny him all compensation or
allow him a reduced compensation or allow him full
compensation."
74
This passage is interesting for several reasons. First, the opening
sentence is false. Before Burrow, agents in general were not subject to the
rule of fee recoupment. Second, nothing in section 243 of the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts discusses fee recoupment. The section and its
comments address only the possibility of reducing or withholding fees that
a trustee has not received.
Third, and more fundamentally, the suggestion the same rule
should apply to all fiduciaries ignores crucial differences between trustees
and litigating attorneys. An attorney with multiple clients may not
subordinate the interests of one client to those of another. An attorney
may act only in ways that are expected to make all clients better off.75 By
contrast, a trustee may prefer one beneficiary to another, and many
74Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 242-43 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 243
1959)).
5 1 have discussed this "no subordination" rule many times. See, e.g., Ellen Smith Pryor
& Charles Silver, Defense Lawyers' Professional Responsibilities: Part II- Contested
Coverage Cases, 15 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 29, 34 (2001); Charles Silver & Kent D.
Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J.
255, 337 (1995).
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trustees make inter-beneficiary tradeoffs routinely. A trustee need only
act impartially.
76
A trustee also can gain protection from a breach of fiduciary duty
charge more easily than an attorney. When the permissibility of a
proposed use of assets is unclear, a trustee can gain complete protection
from a misconduct charge by seeking prior judicial review.77 A trustee
can even bill the cost of a declaratory judgment action as an administrative
expense. No such option exists for a litigating attomey.
In Burrow, the plaintiffs accused the lawyers of subordinating the
interests of some clients to those of others when allocating a settlement
fund. Had the lawyers been trustees, this charge would have faced a
defense of reasonableness. The lawyers also would have been able to
avoid the charge in advance by requesting a declaratory judgment from a
court.
Given these differences, the case for fee recoupment as a remedy
for disloyalty must be argued separately for lawyers and trustees. When it
comes to allocation decisions, lawyers who act without consent will
always be liable, but trustees will be liable only when they abuse their
discretion and fail to obtain judicial review before acting. Because
trustees enjoy more options and greater protection than attorneys, a
draconian rule on fees is easier to defend with respect to them.
In multiple-client lawsuits, a rule of strict liability for inter-client
tradeoffs is especially dangerous. Attorneys cannot handle these lawsuits
without making tradeoffs constantly. Consider the decisions that must be
made when developing clients' claims. A plaintiffs' firm with thousands
of clients with claims against manufacturers of asbestos producers will not
have enough personnel to develop all cases concurrently. The largest such
firm, Baron & Budd of Dallas, Texas, has about 500 lawyers and non-
lawyer employees. Consequently, while some clients are served, others
wait in the queue. The decision to serve some clients now and others later
involves an inter-client tradeoff. In a world where a dollar earned today is
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959) ("When there are two or more
beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them.").
77 Id. § 259 ("The trustee is entitled to apply to the court for instructions as to the
administration of the trust if there is reasonable doubt as to his duties or powers as
trustee.").
78 It may be important to distinguish allocation decisions from other disloyal acts such as
self-dealing. It is entirely possible that agents and trustees should be treated the same
when they act disloyally by putting their own interests ahead of their charges' but treated
differently when their offenses relate to allocations.
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worth more than a dollar earned tomorrow, all clients would rationally
want to be served first.
Client queuing is an example of what Saul Levmore calls a
competition among principals for an agent's services. 79  These
competitions occur across the entire range of resources that agents devote
to matters within their control. A mass tort lawyer with $10,000 to spend
may hire an expert witness to testify on causation or a different expert to
testify on damages. Clients may disagree about the choice. In an
explosion case, victims whose homes were located near the center of a
blast may benefit more from better proof of harm than from better proof of
causation. Victims whose houses were near the periphery may more
greatly need to establish that the force of the blast actually reached their
homes. In an asbestos case, mesothelioma victims may want the damages
expert and pleural disease victims may prefer the expert on causation.
Lawyers handling mass tort cases do not obtain consents when
making strategic decisions like these. They act unilaterally using their
best professional judgment. Nor could they practicably do otherwise. A
requirement of obtaining consent before queuing clients would, by itself,
bring mass tort cases to a halt. Imagine trying to obtain the consent of
1000 clients, or even 100 clients, before deciding which file to work on
next.
Obviously, it is a practical necessity to draw a line between inter-
client tradeoffs that lawyers can make unilaterally, perhaps subject to a
reasonableness requirement, and tradeoffs that require client consent.
Trustees have such a line. They can act without beneficiaries' consent
when they have a reasonable basis for deciding, and they can consult the
courts in advance when their control is challenged. 80
Before Burrow, lawyers had a line too. Demonstrable harm to the
client divided tradeoffs that lawyers could make unilaterally from those
that required consent. In effect, the harm requirement reduced the
practical importance of an ambiguity that inheres in all conflict of interest
rules. For example, Rule 1.7(b) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules") reads as follows: "A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to anther client." 81 As the italicized language
plainly shows, Rule 1.7(b) does not prohibit all interest conflicts. It
distinguishes important conflicts-those that are "materially limit[ing]"--
79 Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1999).
80 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 259 (1959).
81 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1992).
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from unimportant conflicts-those that are not "materially limit[ing]"-
and prohibits only the former. Unfortunately, neither Rule 1.7(b) nor
anything else in the Model Rules explains how, in practice, lawyers can
tell these conflicts apart. Sorting conflicts is inescapably a matter of
judgment because no rigorous analytical distinction can be drawn between
the two.
The conflict rules in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers contain the same ambiguity. The basic rule, set out in section
201, states that "[a] conflict of interest is involved if there is a substantial
risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and
adversely affected ... by the lawyer's duties to another current client."82
The rule specific to litigation conflicts, stated in section 209, contains the
same language.
To the Reporters' credit, the Restatement (Third) attempts to
clarify the materiality requirement. Comment c(ii) to section 201 states
that "[m]ateriality of a possible conflict is determined by reference to
obligations necessarily assumed by the lawyer (see section 28).,,83 In turn,
section 28 states that a lawyer must:
proceed in a manner reasonably calculated to advance a
client's lawful objectives... ;
(1) act with reasonable competence and diligence;
(2) comply with obligations concerning the client's
confidences and property, avoid impermissible
conflicting interests, deal honestly with the client,
and not employ advantages arising from the client-
lawyer relationship in a manner adverse to the
client; and
(3) fulfill valid contractual obligations to the client.84
Obviously, although the Reporters tried to disambiguate the
materiality requirement, they did not succeed. First, the reference to
"impermissible conflicting interests" in subparagraph (2) makes entirely
circular Comment c(ii)'s effort to use section 28 to define material
limitations. Second, subparagraphs (1) and (2) of section 28 both require
judgment calls. Whether a particular use of litigation resources was
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"reasonably calculated" to help a client and demonstrated "reasonable
competence and diligence" on the lawyer's part is precisely what the
former client bringing the breach of fiduciary duty action will deny. The
former client will assert that the lawyer acted unreasonably by making
decisions that put other clients' interests first.
Before Burrow, such an assertion made by a client who could not
prove harm was a non-starter. Now, it automatically entitles a former
client to a trial. Because conflicts inhere in all multiple-client
representations, there usually will be some evidence to show that an
attorney could have served a client better, and there always will be some
expert witness willing to testify that an attorney was disloyal. Every such
claim therefore raises a serious possibility of a partial or complete fee
reduction, and every such claim therefore has settlement value. 85
This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs for claimants and lawyers.
Many claims increase in value when they are joined with others and
litigated in a coordinated manner. An individual pleural disease case is
worthless, yet lawyers have settled large blocks of pleural cases for
millions of dollars. If claimants are to enjoy the advantages of group
lawsuits and if lawyers are to conduct these lawsuits efficiently, it must be
possible for lawyers to make many inter-client tradeoffs without risking
disloyalty charges.
Because most cases settle, it must in particular be possible for
lawyers to propose settlement amounts in mass actions. Many clients have
little idea what their claims are worth. They rely on lawyers to evaluate
their cases and pay them for this service. Yet, when claims are settled in
blocks, as mass tort claims routinely are, a plaintiffs attorney may have
the power to obtain a larger settlement for one client by recommending a
smaller amount for another. Under Burrow, even recommending
settlement amounts when representing multiple clients can conceivably
cost a lawyer a fee.
85To escape this predicament, a defendant-attomey may urge a court to distinguish an
action that harms a client from an omission that merely leaves a client where he or she
stood. Although there are many situations in which the law regards the failure to help as
being both different from and normatively better than the infliction of harm, the
difference is considerably less sharp when the actor is a fiduciary. For example, a trustee
has an affirmative duty to protect the trust corpus and, usually, to enhance its value. A
trustee who fails to invest assets will be held liable for failing "to use reasonable care and
skill to make the trust property productive." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS,
PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 181 (1990).
86 See Richard Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J.
295 (1996).
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A trustee who makes inter-beneficiary tradeoffs can easily avoid
liability.87 A lawyer who makes inter-principal tradeoffs cannot. Yet, in
multiple-client representations, lawyers must make many tradeoffs
unilaterally. Consequently, from a remedial perspective it makes no sense
to subject lawyers and trustees to the same fee forfeiture rule. The harm
requirement protected lawyers by reducing the importance of the
uncertainty surrounding the materiality requirement in the conflict rules.
This layer of insulation helped clients by giving lawyers discretion to
make decisions that could efficiently be left to them.
Burrow unwrapped this insulation. Now, any lawyer who makes a
decision that involves an inter-client tradeoff is exposed to a fee forfeiture
claim-even if the decision was a good one from the perspective of all
clients taken as a group and a reasonable one from the perspective of any
given client. The high-sounding rhetoric of the opinion suggests a desire
to protect clients from interest conflicts absolutely, but this is an
unrealistic goal. In the real world, it is impossible for mass tort lawyers to
represent tens, hundreds, or thousands of clients without making inter-
client tradeoffs daily. A policy of zero-tolerance for interest conflicts
would deprive clients of the advantages of group litigation while offering
no benefits in their place.
V. POLICY ANALYSIS
To this point, I have shown that the Texas Supreme Court distorted
the Restatement (Second) of Agency and Texas agency cases and that the
court's analogy between trustees and agents was superficial and
unpersuasive. Yet, one could respond to all of this by asking why one
should treat P v. A situations different from A v. P situations. Why not
free principals from liability for fees whenever agents act disloyally?
There is an obvious policy justification for the common law
requirements that Burrow swept away, having to do with the need for
evidence that a disloyal act seriously mattered to a client. By now, it
should be clear: (1) that interest conflicts necessarily arise when agents
represent multiple principals concurrently; (2) that acts of imperfect
loyalty are the concrete manifestations of these conflicts; and (3) that
principals knowingly tolerate many such acts, not because deviations from
perfect loyalty are' desirable, but because the cost of avoiding them by
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 259 (1959).
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hiring a sole agent is too great for principals to bear.88 Clients accept
being queued. They accept that lawyers may work harder for some clients
than others. They accept that lawyers allocate scarce financial resources
among multiple matters. They accept that a lawyer may tell one client
confidences communicated by another when explaining how matters are
being handled or why particular matters are being handled first. They
accept that lawyers have important reputational interests that cause them
to be less aggressive or more aggressive than clients desire when dealing
with defendants. They understand that lawyers' fees reflect lawyers'
ability to avoid risks and lower costs by developing portfolios of matters.
Because conflicts are both unavoidable and frequently tolerable,
the common law has to sort conflicts into those that are important for legal
purposes and those that are not. In other words, it has to do what the
Model Rule and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
seek to accomplish by establishing "material affect" requirements. The
common law has, however, drawn the lines more starkly and functionally.
It has used the requirement of discharge to distinguish among conflicts for
one purpose-that of determining whether a principal owes an agent
anything-and it has used demonstrable harm for another-that of
determining whether an agent owes a principal anything.
These are intelligent choices. Consider discharge. Obviously,
discharge is a discrete action that gives one a bright-line rule.89 But there
is more to it than this. A principal who terminates an agent without pay
while a project is ongoing often incurs significant costs and risks. First,
the principal bears the expense of supervising the agent with sufficient
care to discover the wrongdoing. Second, the principal loses the
opportunity to gain a return on the sunk cost of finding, hiring, and
training the agent. Third, the value of the agent's detailed knowledge of
the project acquired through on-the-job experience is lost as well. Fourth,
the project may have to be delayed until a new agent is located, engaged,
and trained. Fifth, the firing may lead other candidates to believe that the
principal is a high-risk employer and make them refuse offers of
employment or demand higher wages. Sixth, the firing may send negative
signals to other relevant audiences, such as investors or other creditors,
88 Even hiring a sole agent would not eliminate conflicts. The interests of principals and
agents never align perfectly. Consequently, the arguments made in the text concerning
agents for multiple principals apply, mutatis mutandis, to agents with single principals as
well.
89 Except for laches, the other defenses recognized by the Restatement (Second) of
Agency (illegality, statutes of frauds, discharge, bankruptcy, and statutes of limitations)
also establish bright-line rules.
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and make them skittish. Seventh, the replacement hire may turn out to be
worse than the old agent. Eighth, the former agent may disagree about the
reasonableness of the discharge and sue for unpaid compensation, saddling
the principal with litigation costs.
Because it is costly to terminate an agent, the decision to discharge
for disloyalty is clear evidence that, in the principal's opinion, the
violation matters. A principal's willingness to monitor an agent closely
enough to discover a violation is itself a strong signal of a principal's
interest in the conduct at issue. Discharge also establishes a bright-line
rule. Consequently, discharge is an appropriate basis for distinguishing
conflicts that terminate an agent's right to compensation from conflicts
that do not.
Now consider provable harm. Although a harm requirement may
establish a duller line than discharge, the line is fairly clear in many
situations and the common law has broad experience with it. In cases like
Kinzbach Tool where an agent receives a hidden commission, the
commission is the principal's loss and its size usually can be determined
straightforwardly. The same is true when, as occurred in Anderson, an
agent makes a secret profit by failing to disclose information relating to a
self-dealing transaction. The difference between the price the agent paid
and the price the agent received is easy to calculate. In Watson, the court
used the sums the limited partners put under the general partners' control
as the measure of their losses. This too is easy to determine.
The hardest kind of case to adjudicate is one like Russell, where an
agent's misconduct causes a principal to incur substantial consequential
damages.90 Here, the line is no brighter than in any other lawsuit where
consequential damages may be recovered. But it is no duller either.
Common law courts have great experience awarding compensation for
losses incurred. Although they have not made an exact science of this
inexact matter, they have developed serviceable procedures for proving up
losses.
Burrow eliminated the common law criteria of discharge and
provable harm. In place of them, the court imposed the general fee
forfeiture provision set out in section 49 of the Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers: "A lawyer engaging in clear and serious
violation of duty to a client may be required to forfeit some or all of the
90 See Russell v. Truitt, 554 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
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lawyer's compensation for the matter.' '9' The court also adopted the list of
factors on which the magnitude of the forfeiture depends.
92
As previously explained, the decision to follow the Restatement
(Third) makes it even harder to understand why the justices butchered
both the Restatement (Second) and prior Texas cases. Why distort legal
authorities when one has an independently sufficient basis for striking out
in a new direction? One reason may be that nothing in section 49
indicates an intention to deviate from the Restatement (Second). To the
contrary, in comments to section 49, the Reporters purport to follow the
Restatement (Second). Thus, Comment b to section 49 cites section
456(b) of the Restatement (Second) as authority, and Comment d cites
section 469. One might therefore conclude that, although the text of
section 49 ignores the distinction between remedies and defenses that the
Restatement (Second) sets out with such care, a major rewrite of the
common law was not intended.93
A second reason is that from start to finish the Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers was mired in controversy. Many scholars
thought it poorly conceived and discouraged the American Law Institute
from undertaking it.94 While the project was ongoing, many criticized the
Reporters' readings of cases and their tendency to take aggressive
positions on the basis of slim authority,95 a tendency the Lead Reporter
admitted.96 When the document was nearly completed, charges of error,
91 Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 237 (Tex. 1999).
92 See id.
93A WESTLAW search of the REST-LGOVL database turned up no discussion of the
Restatement (Second) in any Reporter's Memorandum relating to the fee forfeiture
provision. There is, however, some evidence that the Reporters for the Restatement
(Third) thought they were merely following established common law. See Reporter's
Memorandum to the Members of the Institute, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 1991) ("The Section [i.e., § 49]
states a primarily common-law rule delimiting when a tribunal may order forfeiture of a
lawyer's fees.").
94See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, The ALI's Restatement and the ABA 's Model Rules: Rivals or
Complements? 46 OKLA. L. REV. 25, 25 (1993) (describing the project as "a notable
departure from ALI traditions").
95 See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Caveat Client: How the Proposed Final Draft of the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Fails to Protect Unsophisticated Consumers
in Fee Agreements with Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 581 (1997); Charles Silver &
Michael Sean Quinn, Are Liability Carriers Second-Class Clients? No, But They May Be
Soon-A Call to Arms against the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 6
COVERAGE 21 (Jan./Feb. 1996).
96 See Charles W. Wolfram, Bismarck's Sausages and the ALIs Restatements, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 818-819 (1998) ("[T]he view-which we have striven to follow in
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ideological bias, improper influence and interest conflicts filled the air.
97
Many years and much careful scrutiny will be needed to identify the
sections of the Restatement (Third) that actually express the soundest view
of the law.
Section 49 requires especially close study. As the Reporter's Note
observes, "[s]ome courts have refused to hold fees forfeited when the
client was not harmed.",98  Citations to five cases from five different
jurisdictions follow this admission. Although the manner in which the
Reporter's Note is written makes it impossible to be sure, cited cases that
reject the doctrine of fee recoupment in the absence of harm appear to
outnumber those that endorse it.
The imbalance of authority seems even more lop-sided when one
considers that several of the cases cited in section 49 rely on prior versions
of section 49 as authority.99  Talk about lifting oneself up by the
bootstraps! In an early draft, the Reporters endorsed a controversial
remedy that had little case support. Then, a court cited the early draft as
authority for the fee forfeiture remedy, perhaps reaching a conclusion that
it would have rejected had it thought the matter through for itself instead
of allowing. the prestige of the American Law Institute to dictate its
decision. Then, the Reporters completed the circle by citing the new case
as authority for their view. Obviously, it is dangerous for the common law
to develop this way. Reporters make mistakes, and their mistakes should
not automatically or, indeed, ever become the law.
Three of the cases that TRLF relied upon in its amicus briefs cited
early drafts of section 49 as authority. This includes Hendry v. Pelland,1°°
the case upon which TRLF placed the greatest weight. 1° 1 After finding
"no District of Columbia cases precisely on point," the Hendry Court cited
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers-[is] that a substantive proposition in a
Restatement is warranted as 'restating' the law if it can be rested on the support of at least
one decision in an American jurisdiction.").
97 Entire symposia have been dedicated to the subject. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman,
Caveat Lector: Conflicts of Interest of AL! Members in Drafting the Restatements, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1998). See also Charles Silver, The Lost World: Of Politics and
Getting the Law Right, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 773 (1998).
98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49, Reporter's Note, cmt.
d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
99 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49, COURT
CITATIONS TO RESTATEMENT, THIRD (Tentative Drafts) (1998).
100 73 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
101 TRLF cited Hendry six times, more than any other case. The other tainted cases are
Int'l Materials Corp. v. Sun Corp., 824 S.W.2d 890 (Mo. 1992) and Searcy, Denney,
Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, PA v. Scheller, 629 So. 2d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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section 49 of Tentative Draft No. 4 of the Restatement (Third), published
in 1991, and eliminated the harm requirement. 102 To complete the circle,
in the final draft of section 49 the Reporters cited Hendry in support of
their view that a showing of harm is optional. 1
03
When considering the merit of section 49, one must think for
oneself instead of being led in circles by authorities that refer to each
other. The common law carefully separated principals' remedies against
agents from principals' defenses to agents' claims for unpaid fees,
establishing harm as a condition for the former, and establishing discharge
as a condition for the latter. In the Restatement (Third), the Reporters laid
waste to this structure, apparently by accident and certainly without
providing a careful legal or policy analysis. Instead, they cited cases many
of which relied on prior drafts of section 49.
When one does think for oneself, one quickly sees that the
Restatement (Third)'s "clear and serious violation of a duty to a client"
standard 0 4 is less serviceable than the discharge and provable harm
requirements of the common law. According to the Restatement (Third),
"[a] violation is clear if a reasonable lawyer, knowing the relevant facts
and law reasonably accessible to the lawyer, would have known that the
conduct was wrongful."' 0 5 Obviously, this is a matter that can only be
established through expert testimony and that will require a jury
determination in every case where the experts disagree-which is to say,
in every case, period. What the Restatement (Third) says about
seriousness is even more indeterminate.1 0 6 Unlike the common law, the
"clear and serious" standard contains no criteria that establish bright-line
rules for distinguishing important conflicts from trivial ones.
The loss has serious implications. It is inexpensive for a former
client to sue a lawyer after a lawsuit settles. In Burrow, the plaintiffs put
up about $2,000 each and their lawyer worked on contingency. A
malpractice plaintiff must also contribute time, but for most tort claimants
this is a minor issue. Having already been paid, a former client also
avoids the direct costs that usually flow from the decision to fire an
attorney. The indirect costs are minimal too because tort plaintiffs rarely
have reputational interests to consider.
102 Hendry, 73 F.3d at 401. The court also confused the defense of fee forfeiture with the
remedy of fee recoupment. See id. at 401-02.
103 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 cmt. d
Tentative Drafts) (1998).
04 Id. §49.
105 See id. § 49 cmt. d.
106 See id.
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Two other considerations also matter. First, given the nature of
mass tort cases, some evidence of imperfect conduct can always be found.
Evidence of disloyalty will exist because some inter-client tradeoffs
cannot be avoided. Why did the lawyer work on Client A's case before
Client B's? Did "the squeaky wheel get the grease" even though B's
needs were just as great? Why didn't the lawyer obtain B's consent before
putting his case on the back burner? Evidence also will exist because
attorneys are negotiators and advisors. Why didn't the lawyer recommend
a larger payment for B when bargaining toward settlement? Was it
because the lawyer wanted to keep more money available for A? Why
didn't the lawyer advise A to settle for less so that more money would be
available for B? Why did the lawyer pressure B to settle? Was the lawyer
motivated by a sincere desire to protect B's interests, or did lust for fees
cause the lawyer to twist B's arm excessively?
Second, concerns about disloyalty are easy to feign or exaggerate.
Anyone can say, "I would have fired my lawyer had I known what was
happening." A former client may even believe it. Yet, it is one thing to
talk about changing horses in midstream and an entirely different matter to
accomplish the feat. From a client's perspective, there is little downside
potential attached to the decision to sue a lawyer post-settlement.
Consequently, the act of filing a fee recoupment lawsuit in the absence of
demonstrable harm is not a reliable signal that disloyalty mattered to a
client.
The real question is whether the market will supply attorneys who
are willing to take fee recoupment cases against mass tort lawyers on a
contingent payment basis. Although contingent fee lawyers reject most
requests for representation, there are several reasons for believing that the
"need" will be met. First, because conflicts inhere in all multiple-client
representations, there usually will be some evidence of disloyalty.
Consequently, most fee recoupment cases are likely to have enough merit
to survive pre-trial motions. Second, because mass tort cases involve
millions of dollars in fees, the potential payoff will be high, and the larger
the recovery, the higher the fee to be recouped.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have argued against a zero-tolerance standard for interest
conflicts in multiple client representations. This may be an odd position
for a professor of legal ethics to take, but the zero-tolerance standard is
completely unrealistic. Serviceable arrangements are the best claimants
can hope for in a conflict-ridden world. To eliminate inter-client conflicts,
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one would have to forbid lawyers from representing multiple clients. This
would make clients worse of by denying them the benefits of aggregation.
Interest groups that oppose mass tort lawsuits understand this.
They seek to hold mass tort lawyers to ethical standards that are
impossibly high because they oppose claim aggregation. If they succeed,
every mass tort settlement will become a bona fide fee recoupment
opportunity and attorneys' enthusiasm for mass tort cases will diminish.
Claimants will lose while seeming to win. In theory, they will be entitled
to "gold plated" representation. In practice, lawyers will turn down their
cases.
In Burrow, the Supreme Court of Texas responded to pressure
from one such interest group and created a new remedy calculated to
destabilize the practices of mass tort lawyers. It also disguised what it was
up to by distorting the Restatement (Second).of Agency and prior Texas
cases. An important function of academic commentary is to discourage
conduct like this.
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ADDENDUM
THE SILENCE OF THE COMMENTATORS REVISITED
I am increasingly interested in partisan debates about the legal
profession and in the uses participants in these debates make of ethics
rules and principles. In 1999, this interest led me to write of a bias that
certain politically conservative commentators seemed to exercise when
targeting attorneys for public condemnation. The commentators
castigated plaintiffs' attorneys for attempting to manufacture evidence
while saying nothing about a lawyer defending a product manufacturer
who engaged in similar misconduct.
The plaintiffs' attorneys were lawyers at Baron & Budd who
represented asbestos claimants. The defense lawyer was William J.
Skepnek, an attorney for Raymark Industries, an asbestos manufacturer.
The Baron & Budd incident involved a witness preparation memorandum
that, the commentators asserted, asked clients to lie. The Skepnek incident
involved an affidavit signed by a Raymark executive that, according to
two courts, was both false and known to be false when filed.' Although
both incidents involved charges of evidence fabrication, the pundits
treated them quite differently. They attacked Baron & Budd mercilessly
as soon as the witness preparation memorandum became public. Yet, they
gave Skepnek a pass even after his misconduct was adjudicated and even
though James F. Cobb, the former president of Raymark who signed the
false affidavit, was sanctioned severely.2
Professor Lester Brickman, a participant in this symposium, was
one of the commentators I identified. He published a column in The Wall
Street Journal condemning Baron & Budd. He also has repeatedly lodged
accusations of misconduct against personal injury lawyers, mass tort
lawyers, and private attorneys who handled the states' tobacco cases.
Professor Brickman has not publicly criticized Mr. Skepnek,
however. At the conference that preceded the publication of this
Symposium, I asked him why. The question was natural for another
reason: Skepnek was a lawyer for the plaintiffs in Arce v. Burrow, the fee
recoupment case whose merits Brickman and I debated. By questioning
Brickman, I hoped to explore the possibility that Arce was a strategic
I See Skepnek v. Mynatt, 8 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App. 1999); In re Skepnek, No. 03-98-
00388-CV, 1998 WL 717202 (Tex. App. 1998).
2In re James F. Cobb, 1999 WL 689621 (Tex. App. 1999) (affirming sanctions).
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attack on mass tort lawyers orchestrated by an asbestos manufacturer and
an attorney in its employ.
In response to my prodding, Professor Brickman eliminated
ignorance as a possible explanation for his failure to condemn Mr.
Skepnek. He stated that he was quite familiar with the charges against
Skepnek. He also asserted that my statements regarding those charges
were false, even libelous, and further reported that he knew Skepnek to be
an honorable member of the legal profession. At this point, I interrupted
him, read the audience the citations for the reported cases I relied upon,
and asked Brickman whether he knew any facts suggesting that my
sources were wrong. He responded only by asserting that the sanctions
decisions against Skepnek were still on appeal. I pointed out that this was
only partly true. A WESTLAW search conducted shortly before the
conference showed that one decision against Skepnek was final. I
subsequently learned that the second proceeding was final as well. The
"fact" Brickman purported to know was not one.
In my opinion, Professor Brickman's explanation for his silence
makes his favoritism clear. He gave Skepnek the benefit of the doubt
while withholding it from lawyers at Baron & Budd. He did not wait for a
trial court to find that they acted improperly. Nor did he withhold
judgment pending a final decision by a court of appeals. He publicly
accused the Baron & Budd attorneys of suborning false testimony before
any court decided anything.
In Texas' tobacco case, Professor Brickman also denied plaintiffs'
attorneys the benefit of the doubt. There, he joined forces with politicians,
including then-Governor George W. Bush, who intervened for the purpose
of attacking the private attorneys' fees. In support of their political cause,
he submitted a report accusing the private attorneys of disloyalty and of
charging an excessive fee. He lodged these allegations even though the
settlement garnered what was then the largest civil recovery in history and
even though the presiding federal district court judge had already issued a
lengthy opinion approving the fee. Again in contrast to his treatment of
Skepnek, he passed judgment before any court entered a finding of
wrongdoing; indeed, he did so in the teeth of a decision that the fee was
proper. At last report, Brickman was working with President Bush's
administration on a plan to subject fees earned in tobacco cases to an
excess profits tax.
After the conference ended, it occurred to me that Professor
Brickman may have known more about Mr. Skepnek than he was able to
recall when I put him on the spot by asking him for details. Because I
wanted to know the truth and because Brickman's libel charge rankled me,
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I wrote him and asked for a complete account of his knowledge on the
subject and for copies of or citations to any relevant documents he
possessed.4 In response to my request, Brickman provided no new
information.4
In one respect, I found this comforting., Because Professor
Brickman knew nothing that cast doubt on the accuracy of my account of
the charges against Skepnek, my confidence was restored. In another
respect, Brickman's response disturbed me greatly. A libel charge is a
serious allegation to make against a university-level researcher at an
academic conference. 5 Were I a scientist, the equivalent indictment might
have been that my findings were worthless because I negligently,
intentionally, or recklessly relied upon faulty data. It is now clear that the
charge was baseless and that Brickman acted rashly in making it. The
sanctions decisions against Skepnek are final, and Brickman possesses no
information that casts doubt on the accuracy of my statements.
Professor Brickman's response also surprised me for another
reason. I sought information and documents from him because he claimed
to know things that bore on the accuracy of my public statements. As an
academic, this seemed to me to be the proper course. Yet, Brickman
requested nothing from me in return, even though he knew that I
possessed materials bearing on the accuracy of his rejoinder. When I
wrote him, I expected him to respond by asking for a copy of my file so
that he could test the reasonableness of his defense of Mr. Skepnek and
evaluate the soundness of the libel charge. To me, his failure to seek
access to my materials signals a troubling lack of interest in the facts.
Although Professor Brickman gave me no new information,6 he
did offer to put me in touch with Mr. Skepnek. When preparing my 1999
article, I did not interview Skepnek. The omission was intentional. First,
I thought Skepnek would refuse to talk to me. I knew that, in May of
1998, he invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to answer questions
from a state court judge. I also knew that sanctions litigation against him
JE-mail from Charles Silver, to Lester Brickman (Mar. 27,2001) (on file with author).
4 E-mail from Lester Brickman, to Charles Silver (Mar. 30,2001) (on file with author)("Based upon conversations I have had with William Skepnek, I believe at least some of
the statements you made at the conference were in error and others were misleading ....
[M]y knowledge about the subject matter is incomplete and I am not in any position to
offer a more detailed explanation of the facts.").
5See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1976) (stating the elements of the tort of
defamation).
6Professor Brickman declined my request, routed through the editors of this journal, to
review a draft of the article he contributed to this issue. I am therefore unable here to
incorporate or respond to anything he may have written that bears on my assertions.
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was still proceeding. I therefore concluded that Skepnek would decline to
be interviewed.
Second, I was interested in the way certain commentators on the
legal profession reacted to media reports about Skepnek, not in the truth of
the reports or in Skepnek personally. The commentators seemed to me to
use reports about plaintiffs' -attorneys as occasions for issuing harsh
denunciations while saying nothing when similar reports appeared
concerning corporate defendants or their lawyers. In keeping with this
interest, I focused on public reports about Skepnek. Neither his opinions
on the accuracy of the reports nor his views on the merits of the sanctions
decisions was relevant to my project.
Professor Brickman's offer knocked out the first of these props, so
I asked him to contact Mr. Skepnek for me. He did so, and the letter from
Skepnek that followed began an exchange of correspondence that was
extremely unpleasant, at least for me. Before it ended, though, I learned
some things that are relevant to this article and that require me to clarify or
qualify what I published in 1999.
First, in the earlier piece I wrote that Mr. Skepnek was "convicted
of knowingly filing false affidavits on behalf of Raymark Industries in
lawsuits throughout the State of Texas." Skepnek objects to the word
"convicted," arguing that it applies only to the outcome of a criminal
proceeding. Because I specialize in professional responsibility, I know
that sanctions proceedings are "quasi-criminal" and it sounds natural to me
to describe a sanctioned lawyer as having been "convicted," "punished,"
or "found guilty." I am certain that I have used these phrases and close
synonyms in public presentations many times. Yet, others may associate
convictions solely with felonies or other crimes, as Skepnek claims to.
Because it would be easy to substitute a word like "adjudged" for
7For the record, I note that the commentators I criticized in 1999 made little effort to
investigate the charges against Baron & Budd before castigating the firm. For example,
Walter Olson, an associate of Professor Brickman's at the Manhattan Institute and the
proprietor of Overlawyered.com, reported that "two University of Texas legal-ethics
professors" gave Fred Baron opinions on the propriety of the witness preparation
memorandum. He did not name the professors or, apparently, ask them for copies of
their opinions. He certainly did not contact me, and I am one of the professors Mr. Baron
consulted. Olson also misidentified James McCormack, the former General Counsel for
the State Bar of Texas as "Steven McCormick." See WALTER OLSON, CREATIVE
DEPOSITION (Manhattan Inst. for Pol'y Res., Civil Justice Memo No. 34, May 1998), at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjm_34.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001). On the
general tendency of partisan commentators on the civil justice system to accept factual
assertions without investigating their accuracy, see Marc Galanter, News From Nowhere:
The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77 (1993).
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"convicted," I would gladly make the replacement if I were writing the
sentence today.
Mr. Skepnek also complains that the quoted sentence is inaccurate.
Although the affidavit and the sanctions motions relating to it were filed in
courts throughout Texas, only in Austin and El Paso were sanctions
actually imposed. The rest of the proceedings appear to have lapsed. I
agree that I framed the sentence poorly, and I apologize for its
imprecision. Although Skepnek filed the identical affidavit in many
courts, only two courts actually ruled on the propriety of his conduct and
these rulings, apply only to conduct in the jurisdictions where the courts
sat. I also note, for the record Skepnek's belief that he should not have
been sanctioned at all. He claims to have believed that the affidavit was
true when written, he regards the respects in which it was false as
unimportant and immaterial, and he sees himself as a victim of a campaign
that Fred Baron undertook to distract attention from Baron & Budd's
misconduct. By noting his views, I do not mean to endorse them.
Second, I also wrote in the 1999 article that Mr. Skepnek invoked
the Fifth Amendment and refused to answer questions "[w]hen Senior
Judge Leonard E. Hoffman ordered [him] to appear and testify about an
affidavit filed in his court." Skepnek admits that he did so, but he feels
slighted by my failure to mention certain additional facts. At the hearing,
he claims to have asked Judge Hoffman to transfer the matter to a grand
jury because he believed that Hoffman had prejudged him and because he
objected to the private prosecution of a contempt action by lawyers at
Baron & Budd. After the judge granted this request, Skepnek reports that
he cooperated fully with the prosecutor and was not indicted. He also
states that he waived his Fifth Amendment rights in connection with a
grand jury proceeding in El Paso and was not indicted there.
I did not report these facts because I did not know them. I agree
that they reflect positively on Mr. Skepnek, and I am happy to air them
now. Unfortunately, they do not satisfy my curiosity about the silence of
the conservative commentators in the face of publicly available media and
case reports, which did not contain this information. Nor, apparently, did
conservative commentators obtain this information privately. Professor
Brickman did not mention Skepnek's waiver of his Fifth Amendment
rights when attempting to explain his failure to criticize Skepnek's
misconduct.
When Mr. Skepnek first wrote me, he expressed the belief that I
intentionally presented a partial account of the facts because my object
was to smear him. The charge is false. When researching the 1999
article, I consulted publicly available sources and also obtained
356 [Vol.26:323
A CRITIQUE OF BURROW V. ARCE
unpublished deposition transcripts and court orders from Baron & Budd.
The latter contained information about Skepnek that I did not use,
precisely because the sources were not publicly reported. My subject was
neither Skepnek himself nor the truth of the charges against him. It was a
bias I thought certain conservative commentators displayed when
criticizing lawyers whose conduct is discussed in media reports. Because
I could not use unpublished scources to hang a charge of bias on them, I
omitted the information. Had my object been to smear Skepnek, I would
have had no reason to leave any gun holstered.
Turning to matters of more relevance to Arce, in his letters Mr.
Skepnek explained that he came to represent Raymark Industries after the
Arce plaintiffs hired him. This foreclosed the possibility, which I
seriously entertained, that Raymark inspired and financed the Arce suit.
Skepnek also denied having connections with and receiving financial
support from tort reform groups. He did not explain how Texans for
Reasonable Legal Fees so quickly came to possess a copy of my initial
amicus curiae brief or why that organization chose to file papers of its
own. These are continuing mysteries. Skepnek also disagreed vehemently
with my analysis of the fee forfeiture issue. In his opinion, I give
insufficient weight to the damage that was done to the relationships
between the Arce plaintiffs and their attorneys. Naturally, I do not share
this assessment. If Skepnek wishes to see this criticism developed fully,
he will have to publish his own essay.
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